
In her work
Feminist Theory, from Margin to Center, bell hooks addresses the inextricable link that gender and race/class often have—a fact that became apparent in the midst of the (third-wave) feminist movement that, in attempts to be all-encompassing, failed to address the individual experiences that women had, as shaped by their race. This normative “one-dimensional perspective of women’s reality,” portraying race and gender as mutually exclusive, was not one she found to be representative of her (or other women of color’s) lived experience (hooks 3). Over-generalization became exclusionary in a way that, unfortunately, paralleled elements of society that they were already protesting; perhaps unintentionally on the part of white middle-class feminists, they had drawn attention to the complexity of race relations and their undeniable influence on society. Through comparing hooks’ writing to works by Raymond Williams and Randall Williams, I will consider the implications—both racial and societal—of dominant discourse; what do the terms with which public matters are framed say about power structures (whether intentionally or not)?
hooks found the notion of women’s common bond, as voiced by the “white women who dominate feminist discourse” not only problematic but also highly representative of “white supremacy as a racial politic, of the psychological impact of class, of their political status within a racist, sexist, capitalist state” (hooks 4). Even if the intention was to unify women through defining a collective struggle, the method with which white women (as the movement’s dominant voice) did so may have indicated their unwillingness to acknowledge racial differentiation while simultaneously reaping the benefits of their whiteness. On the other hand, what may have externally appeared to be unwillingness to differentiate may have in reality resulted from a “lack of awareness” of the power setting oneself apart, never having had to experience struggle for lack of racial privilege (hooks 4). This calls into question the basis of societal norms that have become so engrained in people’s minds that they may affect social standing without necessitating awareness of relation to others. The disparity between women’s experiences, as shaped by their race, was only further emphasized by its exclusion in normative discourse—which in turn re-enforced its existence to those of less-privileged social standing. Perhaps in this context, the use of generalizations can only be damaging (even if well-intentioned) through necessitating energy detracted from the original effort in order to address relevant matters of race. Because the discursive frame can be so powerful in shaping public opinion, it is necessary to be cognizant of who is responsible for representation and what that group’s motivation might be for adhering to a specific mode of portrayal. In this case, the lack of counter-hegemonic representation became illustrative of the role of race (and thus social standing) in determining available resources. hooks raises pertinent questions, asking, “who was there to demand a change in vocabulary? What other group of women in the United States had the same access to universities, publishing houses, mass media, money?” (hooks 6). The exclusion of the undeniable diversity of experience as shaped by race sends the message that certain women have the power to define collective experience, whether or not it is based in individual reality.

In
The Divided World: Human Rights and Its Violence, Randall Williams discusses the danger of over-generalization in the context of human rights discourse. Here too, just as with feminist theory, the discursive frame is highly indicative of the intentions of those responsible for its constitution. The perception of human rights can easily shift from one end of a spectrum to the other, having the potential to be viewed either as “optimistic formulations” that encourage hope or as “ [providing] a convenient cover for the extension of capitalist-democratic uneven relations of power by reinforcing imperialist hegemonic control” (Randall Williams xv). Ironically (and unfortunately), although human rights discourse may have initially emerged as a way of addressing societal injustice, it seems that the ever-growing disparity between the “haves” and the “have-nots” only emphasizes (for those willing to acknowledge it) that while it may be serving a strategic purpose, the benefits are not being experienced by those most in need of them. As a powerful capitalist nation, the United States has historically been able to publicly justify colonial, economic self-interest through an appeal to public sympathy for human rights. But whose rights are actually being protected when “since 1945, the advance of global capitalism has been, in the main, driven by the ascendance of U.S. imperial power (economic and military)”? (Randall Williams xix). Even today, the U.S. employs the “hegemonic maneuvering” Williams discusses, as it defends military attacks clearly serving political self-interest and power by portraying such actions as liberating the human rights of less-developed (and non-white) nations in “need” of intervention. In this case, too, race is linked to privilege and notions of power over others, including the ability to manipulate public opinion to disguise the presence of such notions.

Although Raymond Williams, in
Marxism and Literature, is discussing notions of discourse in more philosophical terms, the implications for race and society are just as real. Williams applauds Gramsci’s “necessary recognition of dominance and subordination” in social processes shaped by class inequalities (which are undoubtedly informed by race) (Raymond Williams 108). He acknowledges the power of excluding experience from hegemonic discourse in a way that parallels hooks’ discussion of a similar phenomenon. It is only through including the various interdependent aspects of lived experience in a given society that “the concept of ‘hegemony’ [can go] beyond ‘ideology’” (Raymond Williams 109). It seems that Williams is begging the question: what purpose does hegemonic discourse serve if it fails to provide an accurate, non-linear portrayal; doesn’t this detract from the action that would ideally be encouraged by political discourse, reducing it to a simple abstraction? The constant interplay between the hegemonic and counter-hegemonic that Williams mentions can certainly be seen in hooks’ struggle against exclusive feminist philosophy in addition to Randall Williams’ appeal to consider the strategy surrounding human rights’ discursive frame.
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